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NOTE
BUSINESS GUIDES, INC. v. CHR OMA TIC
COMMUNICATIONS ENTERPRISES: THE
CASE FOR RULE 11 REFORM
Pursuant to its rulemaking authority,' the United States Supreme Court
prescribed the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.2 The Federal Rules
secured one form of action3 by unifying the procedure for cases at law, in
equity, and in admiralty.' Each federal rule is designed to secure the just
and efficient determination of every civil action brought in the United States
district courts.' The current Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (Rule 11 ),6
1. Rules Enabling Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1988)). The Rules Enabling Act currently provides in
pertinent part: "(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure .... (b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substan-
tive right." 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988).
2. The original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted by the Supreme Court on
December 20, 1937, were submitted to the 75th Congress on January 3, 1938, and became
effective on September 16, 1938. See 4 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1004, at 27-28 (2d ed. 1987); 7 JAMES W. MOORE ET
AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 86.02, at 86-5 (2d ed. 1991).
3. FED. R. CIv. P. 2. Rule 2 provides that "[tihere shall be one form of action to be
known as 'civil action.' " Id.
4. See id.
5. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1. Rule 1 provides in part that the federal rules "shall be con-
strued to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Id.
6. Rule I currently reads as follows:
[1] Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name,
whose address shall be stated. [2] A party who is not represented by an attorney
shall sign the party's pleading, motion, or other paper and state the party's address.
[3] Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not
by verified or accompanied by affidavit. [4] The rule in equity that the averments of
an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. [5] The signature of
an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, informa-
tion, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. [6] If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken
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for example, requires every pleading, motion, or other paper to be signed by
an attorney or unrepresented party.7 It further provides that "[t]he signa-
ture of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the
signer has read the ... paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge...
formed after a reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted
by existing law."' The plain language of Rule 11 imposes an affirmative
duty upon attorneys and pro se litigants to certify that prior to filing any
paper with the court, they conduct a reasonable inquiry and conclude that
the paper is legally tenable and well grounded in fact.9
Rule 11 articulates a distinct standard by which the signer's prefiling in-
quiry is measured. ' Specifically, all thirteen federal circuits have held that
an attorney's certification is evaluated by an objective standard of reasona-
bleness under the circumstances." The objective reasonable inquiry stan-
dard of Rule 11 similarly applies to unrepresented litigants, although the
courts may take into account the special circumstances characterizing pro se
situations.' 2 A primary purpose of the objective standard is to broaden the
unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader
or movant. [7] If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule,
the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include
an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Bracketed numbers before each sentence of Rule 11 have been added in
conformity with the majority opinion in Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications
Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991), so as to clarify the discussion that follows. See 111 S. Ct. at 928.
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
8. Id.
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (stressing the need for prefiling inquiry
into both the facts and law in order to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the rule); see also
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990) (reaffirming the duty imposed by
amended Rule 11).
10. The prefiling inquiry is measured by an objective standard of reasonableness under the
.circumstances. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
11. Muthig v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 838 F.2d 600, 604-05 (1st Cir. 1988); Eastway
Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253-54 (2d Cir. 1985) (Eastway I); Eaven-
son, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 540 (3d Cir. 1985); Stevens v. Law-
yers Mut. Liab. Ins., 789 F.2d 1056, 1060 (4th Cir. 1986); Davis v. Veslan Enters., 765 F.2d
494, 497 (5th Cir. 1985); Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217, 1221 (6th Cir. 1986); Rod-
gers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 194, 205 (7th Cir. 1985); Adduono v. World Hockey
Ass'n, 824 F.2d 617, 621 (8th Cir. 1987); Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829
(9th Cir. 1986); Burkhart ex rel. Meeks v. Kinsley Bank, 804 F.2d 588, 589-90 (10th Cir.
1986); Hashemi v. Campaigner Publications, 784 F.2d 1581, 1583 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Westmore-
land v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Maier v. Orr, 758 F.2d 1578, 1584
(Fed. Cir. 1985).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note. Compare Patterson v. Aiken, 111
F.R.D. 354, 358 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (sanctioning pro se party), aff'd, 841 F.2d 386 (11th Cir.
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range of circumstances in which the courts will impose sanctions and
thereby increase Rule lI's effectiveness in deterring abuses of the litigation
process. 13
Although interpretation of Rule 11 is uniform with regard to the standard
imposed upon attorneys and unrepresented parties, a conflict developed be-
tween the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Ninth Cir-
cuits. The circuits disagreed on whether Rule 11 imposes an objective
reasonable inquiry standard upon represented parties as well when they have
signed a pleading, motion, or other paper. In Calloway v. Marvel Entertain-
ment Group, 4 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
vacated sanctions against a represented party because the district judge, in
imposing sanctions, appeared to have applied an objective test to the party's
conduct.'" The Second Circuit determined that Rule 11 sanctions should
not fall upon a represented party unless that party intentionally misleads his
attorney or is personally aware that his filing and signing of a pleading was
wrong.1 6 The Second Circuit, therefore, distinguishes attorneys from repre-
sented litigants for Rule 11 purposes and holds the latter to a subjective bad
faith standard.' 7
In Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises,8 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the Second
Circuit's rationale in Calloway and refused to adopt a subjective standard for
represented parties. 9 Based upon its reading of the text of Rule 11 and the
Advisory Committee's Note, the Ninth Circuit concluded that application of
an objective reasonable inquiry standard to represented parties is "consistent
with the primary purpose behind Rule 11: deterrence of frivolous litiga-
1988) with Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235, 1239-44 (11th Cir. 1989) (reversing sanction
against pro se party as an abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 261 (1990).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
14. 854 F.2d 1452 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom., Pavelic &
LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989).
15. Id. at 1474. Specifically, the court held that an objective test "is appropriate only in
evaluating the conduct of attorneys under Rule 11, not the conduct of parties represented by
attorneys." Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. The court fortified its distinction between attorneys and their clients on the
grounds that good faith does not excuse misconduct by attorneys, who are licensed profession-
als expected to measure up to minimum standards of competence and professional responsibil-
ity. Id.; see also Cross & Cross Properties v. Everett Allied Co., 886 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1989)
(following Calloway); Greenberg v. Hilton Int'l, 870 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1989) (same).
18. 892 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1989), aff'd, I11 S. Ct. 922 (1991).
19. Id. at 810-11. The opinion methodically considers and rejects each factor cited in
Calloway in support of a subjective standard for represented parties. Id.; accord Cleveland
Demolition Co. v. Azcon Scrap Corp., 827 F.2d 984, 987-88 (4th Cir. 1987); Portnoy v. Wher-
ehouse Entertainment Co., 120 F.R.D. 73, 74 (N.D. Il1. 1988).
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tion. ' 20 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 2 to address whether Rule 11
"imposes an objective standard of reasonable inquiry on represented parties
who sign pleadings, motions, or other papers."
22
The Business Guides case originated as an action filed in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, claiming copyright
infringement and seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO).23 Business
Guides, Inc. (Business Guides), a publisher of a computer products and serv-
ices directory, deliberately planted erroneous information, known as
"seeds, in its published directories.25 Business Guides pioneered the seed-
ing method in an effort to protect itself against copyright infringement by
competitors. 6 The presence of these seeds in a competitor's directory con-
stitutes strong evidence of copyright infringement.27
In support of its complaint against Chromatic Communications Enter-
prises, Inc. (Chromatic), Business Guides submitted to the court several affi-
davits identifying the presence of ten seeds in Chromatic's directory.28
Various Business Guides' employees involved in the seeding process signed
these affidavits before they were filed in district court.29 The district court
judge's law clerk, prior to the hearing on the TRO, spent approximately one
hour telephoning the businesses identified by Business Guides as seeds and
discovered that all but one of the seeds actually contained accurate informa-
tion.3° Based on this discovery, the district court denied the TRO, stayed
further proceedings, and referred the matter to a magistrate to determine
whether Rule 11 sanctions should be imposed against Business Guides.3"
20. Business Guides, 892 F.2d at 811. For a discussion of the purposes behind Rule 11,
see infra text accompanying notes 78-85.
21. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., i10 S. Ct. 3235 (1990).
22. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922, 925
(1991).
23. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 119 F.R.D. 685, 686
(N.D. Cal. 1988).
24. Id. Business Guides utilized two types of seeds: "Type A" seeds were entirely ficti-
tious entries of nonexistent businesses, and "Type B" seeds were minor alterations such as
misspelled names or transposed numbers in otherwise accurate listings. Business Guides, 892
F.2d at 804.
25. Business Guides, 119 F.R.D. at 686.
26. Business Guides, 892 F.2d at 812.
27. Business Guides, 119 F.R.D. at 686.
28. Id. Upon further investigation, Business Guides retracted its claim of copying with
respect to three of the ten original seeds because they in fact contained correct information.
Business Guides submitted a supplemental affidavit supporting its claim as to the remaining
seven seeds. Business Guides, 892 F.2d at 805.
29. Id. at 804-05.
30. Id. at 805.
31. Business Guides, 119 F.R.D. at 687. The sanction proceedings before the magistrate
concerned both Business Guides and its attorneys, the law firm of Finley, Kumble, Wagner,
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After three evidentiary hearings, the magistrate found that although Busi-
ness Guides had acted in good faith, 2 Rule 11 sanctions were nevertheless
appropriate because Business Guides failed to conduct a reasonable in-
quiry.3 The district court adopted the magistrate's findings and held that
"[tlhe standard of conduct under Rule 11 is one of objective reasonableness.
Applying this standard to the circumstances in this case, it is clear that...
Business Guides... violated the Rule." 4 Business Guides was subsequently
ordered to pay to Chromatic $13,865.66 for legal expenses and costs as a
sanction. 5 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit rejected Business Guides' argument that represented parties may not
be sanctioned under Rule 11 and affirmed the district court's holding that
Business Guides was subject to an objective standard of reasonable inquiry
into the factual basis of the affidavits filed in support of its TRO
application.
36
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision. 37 The Court held
that the certification requirement of Rule 11 applies to represented parties in
addition to attorneys and pro se litigants.3 The Court also determined that
represented parties are held to the same objective standard that is imposed
on attorneys and pro se litigants under Rule I1.3 Thus, Rule 11 sanctions
against Business Guides were held to be proper where the company failed to
conduct a reasonable inquiry before signing the affidavits in support of its
initial TRO application.'g
Heine, Unterberg, Manley, Myerson & Casey. Sanctions against the law firm, however, were
not an issue in this case because Finley, Kumble dissolved, and sanction proceedings against it
were stayed pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Com-
munications Enters., 121 F.R.D. 402, 403 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
32. The magistrate accepted Business Guides' explanation that a departure from its nor-
mal methodology in compiling its "master seed list" resulted in the seeded listings actually
containing correct information. Business Guides, 892 F.2d at 806.
33. Business Guides, 119 F.R.D. at 687. The magistrate decided that sanctions against
Business Guides were appropriate because the company failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry,
resulting in the presentation of erroneous material which it "knew or should have known [was]
unreliable for the purpose of creating evidence of copyright infringement." Id.
34. Id. at 688-89.
35. Business Guides, 121 F.R.D. at 405.
36. Business Guides, 892 F.2d at 812. The court of appeals, however, vacated the order of
sanctions and remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration on other grounds. Id.
at 813.
37. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922, 935
(1991). A majority of five Justices affirmed the decision. Justices Marshall, Stevens, Scalia,
and Kennedy dissented. Id. at 925.
38. Id. at 929-31.
39. Id. at 931-33.
40. Id. at 935.
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Finally, the Court held that imposing monetary sanctions against a repre-
sented party that acts in good faith does not constitute impermissible fee-
shifting in violation of the Rules Enabling Act.4 The majority differentiated
between legislatively prescribed fee-shifting, in which the prevailing party is
awarded attorney's fees, and Rule 11 sanctions.42 Having determined that
its application of Rule 11 was consistent with the Rules Enabling Act, the
majority affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.43
Justice Kennedy, in his dissent, rejected the application of an objective
reasonable inquiry standard to represented parties, favoring instead a subjec-
tive bad faith standard in determining whether a represented party violated
Rule 11." Justice Kennedy concluded that Rule 11 binds only those parties
whose signatures are provided for in the Rule itself.45 Because the amended
version of the Rule only requires the signature of an attorney or pro se liti-
gant, Justice Kennedy reasoned that an attorney must violate Rule 11 before
a represented party can be sanctioned and that the sanction would be an
abuse of discretion unless the represented party acted in bad faith.46
Justice Kennedy also argued that the majority's interpretation of Rule 11
exceeds the Court's rulemaking authority by permitting fee-shifting in the
absence of bad faith.4 Alternatively, the dissent emphasized the chilling
effect that will likely result from the Court's extension of a valid Federal
Rule well beyond its traditional scope. 48 On either ground, the dissent con-
cluded that the majority's interpretation of Rule 11 was improper.4 9
This Note examines the development of Rule 11 sanctions on attorneys
and represented parties. It first examines Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and its 1983 amendment. This Note then surveys the rele-
vant judicial and scholarly criticism that has evolved since the amendment.
Next, this Note analyzes the United States Supreme Court's decision in Busi-
ness Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises in light of this
prior criticism. This Note concludes that even though Business Guides ad-
41. Id. at 933-34.
42. Id. at 934. The Court pointed out that "Rule 11 sanctions are not tied to the outcome
of litigation; the relevant inquiry is whether a specific filing was [frivolous]. Nor do sanctions
shift the entire cost of litigation; they shift only the cost of a discrete event." Id.
43. Id. at 934-35.
44. Id. at 943 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy's dissent was joined by Justices
Marshall and Stevens, and was joined in part by Justice Scalia. Id. at 935.
45. Id. at 936.
46. Id. at 942-43.
47. Id. at 940-41.
48. Id. at 940-42. "Whether or not Rule 11 as construed by the majority exceeds our
rulemaking authority, these concerns weigh in favor of a reasonable, alternative interpretation,




vances the purpose behind the 1983 amendment, the decision is unfaithful to
the plain language of the Rule. This Note recommends that Rule 11 be
revised in order to effectively regulate abuses of the judicial system.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULE 11
A. The Rulemaking Process
Rule lI's development began with the original promulgation of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.50 The Supreme Court appointed an
Advisory Committee of distinguished lawyers and law professors to prepare
and submit to the Court a draft of the Federal Rules.51 Advisory Committee
drafts were repeatedly distributed for public comment and discussed by the
Judicial Conference of the United States.52 After carefully revising the final
draft recommended by the Advisory Committee,5 3 the Supreme Court
adopted the Federal Rules and submitted them to the Congress.54 The
Rules Enabling Act requires no affirmative adoption of the Federal Rules by
Congress; therefore, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective
with the adjournment of the 75th Congress in 1938." 5
Amendments to the Federal Rules must be made in accordance with the
procedures prescribed by the Judicial Conference.56 Proposed rules and
amendments are recommended by the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules.57 A proposed change is then reviewed by the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure, which recommends the proposal to the
Judicial Conference for adoption by the Supreme Court.5" Once the propo-
sal is adopted, the Supreme Court must submit it to Congress no later than
May 1 of the year in which the proposal would become effective.59 Unless
Congress acts otherwise, the proposed rule or amendment becomes effective
no earlier than December 1 of the year in which the proposal was submitted
50. See supra note 2. For a thorough study of original Rule 11, see generally D. Michael
Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1976).
For a discussion of the original version of Rule 11, see infra text accompanying notes 61-75.
51. Order Appointing Advisory Committee, 295 U.S. 774 (1935). By order of January 5,
1942, the Supreme Court appointed a standing Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. Continu-
ance of Advisory Committee, 314 U.S. 720 (1942).
52. See 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, at 24-26.
53. See 4 id. at 25.
54. Order Adopting Civil Rules, 302 U.S. 783 (1937).
55. See 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, at 27-28.
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(1) (1988).
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(2).
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 2074,
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to Congress.6° In addition to the rulemaking process, a contemporary un-
derstanding of Rule 11 is further enhanced by an examination of the text of
the original version of the Rule.
B. Original Rule 11
Adopted as part of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the original
version of Rule 1161 consolidated and unified pleading practices in existence
at the time.62 Most notably, the original version of Rule 11 incorporated the
Federal Equity practice requiring counsel's signature as an affirmation that
there was good grounds for a pleading.6 3 The original version of Rule 11
provided in pertinent part that "[t]he signature of an attorney constitutes a
certification by him that ... there is good ground to support [a paper]; and
that it is not interposed for delay."'6' This certification standard indicates
that original Rule 11 was intended to secure a lawyer's subjective honesty.
66
While the focus of the subjective certification standard was the conduct of
the attorney, 67 the only explicitly authorized sanction for a violation of the
original Rule was aimed at the client. 68 A pleading filed in violation of origi-
60. Id.
61. The original Rule 1 read as follows:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one
attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party
who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address.
Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be
verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an
answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best
of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that
it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to
defeat the purpose of the rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action
may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a wilful violation of
this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar
action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 308 U.S. 676 (1938).
62. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 308 U.S. 676 (1938).
63. See Risinger, supra note 50, at 8-14. The "good grounds" certification requirement
found in Rule 24 of both the 1842 and 1912 Equity Rules was intended to "secure lawyer
honesty." Id. at 13-14.
64. See supra note 61 (quoting the complete text of original Rule 11).
65. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 308 U.S. 676 (1938).
66. See Risinger, supra note 50, at 14.
67. "The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him .... Fed. R. Civ. P.
11, 308 U.S. 676 (1938).
68. "If a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of the rule, it




nal Rule 11 was to be stricken, whereas disciplinary action against the attor-
ney was to be taken only for a "wilful violation ' 69 of the Rule.7 ° Faced with
this draconian sanction, which often penalized innocent clients, and the diffi-
culty of determining subjective bad faith, the courts were reluctant to utilize
the Rule.7 1 Consequently, original Rule 11 withered and became an ineffec-
tive tool for deterring abuses of the litigation process.7 2 By the early 1980's,
however, the federal judicial system experienced a "litigation explosion,",
73
marked by the excessive use and frequent abuse of the litigation process,74
which necessitated an effective rule for disciplining litigants and their
attorneys.
69. Id.
70. Id.; see, e.g., Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1166-67 (7th Cir.
1983) (construing "willful violation" to require a subjective bad faith test); Nemeroff v. Abel-
son, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980) (same).
71. See, e.g., Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11 - Some
"Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J.
1313, 1315-16 (1986) [hereinafter Nelken, Sanctions].
72. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (stating that "[e]xperience shows
that in practice [original] Rule 11 has not been effective in deterring abuses"); see also Risinger,
supra note 50, at 34-37 (observing that between 1938 and 1976, there were only 19 genuine
Rule 11 motions reported); Nelken, Sanctions, supra note 71, at 1315-16 (commenting on the
lack of effectiveness of original Rule 11).
73. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 2-12 (1984) (attributing the tremendous increase in litigation to (1) the changing de-
mography of the legal profession, (2) the proliferation of federal substantive rights, (3) the
liberal and egalitarian notice pleading system, and (4) economic incentives of contemporary
litigation); see also Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U. L. REV.
767 (1977) (describing the litigation explosion as "hyperlexis"). But see Marc Galanter, The
Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 28-39 (1986) (arguing against the de-
structive consequences of the litigation explosion by pointing to anecdotal benefits obtained by
resort to the judicial system); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We
Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 61-71 (1983) (arguing that the litigation explosion, or hyperlexis,
is not a crisis but rather is a necessary, although not optimal, adaptation to changing social
conditions).
74. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 - A
Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 181-82 (1985) [hereinafter Schwarzer, A Closer Look]. Judge
Schwarzer notes that "[riesort to frivolous litigation, maintenance of baseless defenses, and
harassment of one's opponent are practices that judges and lawyers engaged in civil litigation
encounter regularly." Id. at 182. For discussions on frivolous litigation generally, see John W.
Wade, On Frivolous Litigation: A Study of Tort Liability and Procedural Sanctions, 14 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 433 (1986) and Neal H. Klausner, Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11: Preventing
Frivolous Litigation by Demanding Professional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 300 (1986).
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C. 1983 Amendment
In an effort to deter frivolous and unfounded litigation, the United States
Supreme Court amended Rule I1 in 1983. 7' The amendment reflected a
deliberate effort to correct the deficiencies that plagued the original version
of the Rule76 and to thereby craft a tool to effectively protect the judicial
system from abusive litigation tactics.77
1. The Purpose of Amended Rule 11
Commentary concerning the underlying purpose of Rule 11 sanctions vac-
illates among three possibilities--compensation, punishment, and deter-
rence.78 It is generally recognized, however, that deterrence is the central
purpose behind the amended Rule.79 This school of thought follows natu-
75. Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983) (amendment
effective August 1, 1983).
76. The Advisory Committee's Note accompanying the 1983 amendment indicated that
"[there has been considerable confusion as to (1) the circumstances that should trigger strik-
ing a pleading or motion or taking disciplinary action, (2) the standard of conduct expected of
attorneys who sign pleadings and motions, and (3) the range of available and appropriate
sanctions." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note; see supra notes 61-74 and accompa-
nying text.
77. See infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the purposes behind
the 1983 amendment to Rule 11.
78. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Ex-
ample of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1932-33 (1989) [hereinafter Burbank, Transforma-
tion] (discussing the relationship between deterrence and compensation); Victor H. Kramer,
Viewing Rule 11 as a Tool to Improve Professional Responsibility, 75 MINN. L. REV. 793, 802-
07 (1990) (stating that the Rule's sanctioning provision "suggests that compensation or reim-
bursement is the principal or, at least, an important purpose of Rule 11"); Nelken, Sanctions,
supra note 71, at 1323-25 (surveying the "conflicting conceptions of sanctions"); Jeffrey A.
Parness, More Stringent Sanctions Under Federal Civil Rule 11: A Reply to Professor Nelken,
75 GEO. L.J. 1937, 1938-39 (1987) (arguing that "[p]unishment, compensation, and deterrence
may all serve as objectives of rule 11"); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118
F.R.D. 189, 203-04 (1988) (discussing compensation, punishment, and deterrence oriented
judges); Alan E. Untereiner, Note, A Uniform Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97 YALE L.J.
901, 905-07 (1988) (describing the vacillation among compensation, deterrence, and
punishment).
79. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (concluding that
"the imposition of sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 is meant to deter attorneys from violating the
rule"); In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1183 (9th Cir. 1986) (ruling that the primary purpose of
Rule 11 "is to deter subsequent abuses"); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F.
Supp. 558, 564-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (focusing on deterrence as Rule I l's primary purpose),
modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.) (Eastway 11), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987); see also
Burbank, Transformation, supra note 78, at 1944 (pointing out that Rule 11 is intended to
effect both specific and general deterrence); Kramer, supra note 78, at 803 (recognizing that
the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter frivolous conduct); William W. Schwarzer, Rule
11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1019-20 (1988) [hereinafter Schwarzer, Revisited] (stat-
ing that "[t]he proper role of rule 11 ... is to deter litigation abuse"); Untereiner, supra note
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rally from the clear emphasis on deterrence found in the Advisory Commit-
tee's Note accompanying the 1983 amendment.
80
The United States Supreme Court addressed the underlying purpose of
Rule 11 in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp."' In Cooter & Gell, the Court
summarily8 2 asserted that Rule I l's overriding goal is the deterrence of abu-
sive litigation practices in the federal courts. 83 The interpretation that Rule
I I's purpose is to deter baseless filings is strengthened by an examination of
the two major substantive changes in the body of the amended Rule: the
adoption of an objective certification standard84 and the expanded scope of
sanctions.8 5
2. The Objective Certification Standard
The most significant change effected by the 1983 amendment to Rule 11
was the explicit adoption of an objective certification standard.8 6 As evi-
denced by the Advisory Committee's Note, the objective standard was in-
tended to increase Rule lI's deterrent effect by requiring a prefiling inquiry
into both the facts and the law contained in the paper.87 Indeed, original
Rule 11 's failure in this regard prompted the Rule's revision in 1983.8
78, at 912 (arguing that judicial acceptance of deterrence as the primary purpose would pro-
mote uniformity in Rule 11 sanctions).
80. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (stating that "[fthe word 'sanctions'
in the caption ... stresses a deterrent orientation in dealing with improper pleadings, motions
or other papers"). Nevertheless, judicial opinions frequently argued that the competing ratio-
nales were paramount. E.g., Eastway II, 821 F.2d at 124-26 (dissenting opinion); In re TCI,
Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 1985).
81. 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
82. The Supreme Court's determination was apparently based solely on the Advisory
Committee's Note accompanying the 1983 amendment and the legal commentary of William
W. Schwarzer and Georgene M. Vairo. See id. at 393 (citing to Schwarzer, A Closer Look,
supra note 74, and Vairo, supra note 78).
83. Id. The Court stated that "[i]t is now clear that the central purpose of Rule 11 is to
deter baseless filings ... and thus ... any interpretation must give effect to the rule's central
goal of deterrence." Id. (citations omitted).
84. See infra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 105-29 and accompanying text.
86. "[5] The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that
the signer has read the.., paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (reporting that "[t]he standard is one of
reasonableness under the circumstances. This standard is more stringent than the original
good-faith formula and thus it is expected that a greater range of circumstances will trigger its
violation") (citation omitted).
88. See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text for a description of the ineffectiveness of
original Rule 11.
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Sentences [1] and [2] of the Rule require the signature of an attorney or a
pro se litigant, respectively, to appear on every pleading, motion, and other
paper.89 Sentence [5] explains in detail the significance attached to the sig-
nature of an attorney or party by Rule 11.90 Such a signature certifies that
the signer has performed a reasonable inquiry and concluded that the paper
"is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law."' Whether the
signer has conducted a reasonable inquiry depends, inter alia, upon such
factors as the amount of time available to the signer for investigation and
whether the signer relied on a client for the facts underlying a paper.92
In Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York,9 3 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted the objective standard of
reasonableness under the circumstances for Rule 11.94 In response to the
widespread corruption that infected New York City's housing rehabilitation
loan program, the City enacted sweeping changes in the program's policy
which effectively barred Eastway Construction Corporation (Eastway) from
receiving any rehabilitation contracts. 95 Eastway then filed a lawsuit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging
civil rights and antitrust violations by the City. 96 The district court granted
the City's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Eastway's action,
finding no basis for either claim.97 The City's motion for attorney's fees,
however, was denied.98
The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Eastway's action. 99 The
court remanded the case, however, ordering the district court to award an
appropriate attorney's fee pursuant to Rule 11.100 The court held that a
89. "[1] Every ... paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least
one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name .... [2] A party who is not repre-
sented by an attorney shall sign the party's ... paper . FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
90. See supra note 86.
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. For purposes of this Note, the "improper purpose" clause of
sentence [5] is irrelevant and will not be discussed.
92. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
93. 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985) (Eastway I).
94. Id. at 253-54.
95. Id. at 246.
96. Id. at 248. Prior to the district court proceedings, Eastway initiated a state action in
the New York State Supreme Court. This lawsuit was eventually dismissed. Id. at 247 (citing
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. Gliedman, 446 N.Y.S.2d 306 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)).
97. Id.
98. Id. The City moved for attorney's fees on multiple grounds, including Rule 11. Id. at
252-53.
99. Id. at 254.
100. Id. On remand, the district court awarded the City of New York $1,000 in attorney's
fees under Rule 11. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 584
(E.D.N.Y. 1986), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987). The
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violation of Rule 11 does not require a finding of subjective bad faith.' ° '
Rather, according to the Second Circuit, the failure to conduct a reasonable
inquiry into the viability of a paper constitutes a violation of the Rule. ' 0 2 In
Eastway, the Second Circuit concluded that Eastway's claims were ground-
less and that a reasonable inquiry would have led a competent attorney to
reach the same conclusion.10 3 By 1988, all thirteen federal circuits had
adopted the objective standard contained in the 1983 amendment to the
Rule.'o4
3. The Expanded Scope of Sanctions
The second significant change to Rule 11 was the development of a more
effective sanctioning provision.' 0 5 The 1983 amendment to the Rule ex-
panded the scope of Rule 11 sanctions in two ways. First, in response to the
judicial reluctance to impose sanctions under original Rule 11,106 the court's
discretion with regard to the imposition of sanctions was removed, making
sanctions for the violation of Rule 11 mandatory. 0 7 Secondly, the courts
were granted broad discretion with regard to the nature and target of the
sanctions under the amended language of the Rule.'
In order to make sanctions for the violation of amended Rule 1 1
mandatory, sentence [7] states that a court "shall impose" sanctions when a
signature violates the Rule.'0 9 The Advisory Committee's Note accompany-
ing the 1983 amendment highlights the mandatory nature of Rule 11 sanc-
tions. Specifically, the Advisory Committee's Note states that "the words
Second Circuit modified the sanction on appeal to $10,000. Eastway II, 821 F.2d 121, 122 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
101. Eastway I, 762 F.2d at 253-54. Referring to original Rule 11, Judge Kaufman stated
that "[n]o longer is it enough for an attorney to claim that he acted in good faith, or that he
personally was unaware of the groundless nature of an argument or claim .... Simply put,
subjective good faith no longer provides the safe harbor it once did." Id. at 253; see also
Schwarzer, A Closer Look, supra note 74, at 187 (noting that "[t]here is no room for a pure
heart, empty head defense under Rule 11").
102. Eastway I, 762 F.2d at 253-54.
103. Id. at 254.
104. See supra note 11; cf Risinger, supra note 50, at 59-61 (foreshadowing Rule I l's tran-
sition to an objective standard).
105. "[7] If a... paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its
own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an
appropriate sanction .... " FED. R. Civ. P. It.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 67-74.
107. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11; infra note 113 and accompanying text; cf Schwarzer, A Closer
Look, supra note 74, at 200 (predicting that courts will not "consider themselves bound by the
rule's mandatory language").
108. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11; infra note 113 and accompanying text.
109. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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'shall impose' in the last sentence focus the court's attention on the need to
impose sanctions for pleading and motion abuses.""
Although sanctions for the violation of Rule 11 are mandatory, the nature
and target of the sanctions are discretionary."l' Sentence [7] provides that
when a paper is signed in violation of Rule 11, the court "shall impose upon
the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanc-
tion."' 2 Thus, the court retains discretion with regard to what constitutes
an appropriate sanction as well as upon whom that appropriate sanction
should be imposed.' 3 The plain language of the Rule as well as the Advi-
sory Committee's Note have led courts to interpret sentence [7] as a
mandatory provision requiring the imposition of a discretionary sanction."1 4
In Thomas v. Capital Security Services, Inc.," 5 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted the interpretation that Rule 11 man-
dates the imposition of a discretionary sanction. 1 6 Several employees filed a
Title VII civil rights class action against their employer, Capital Security
Services, Inc. (Capital). 1 7 After a three day bench trial in which Capital
prevailed on the merits, the district court denied the employer's motion for
attorney's fees. 1 8 The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded the district
court's order denying attorney's fees. 1 9 The court held that once a violation
of Rule 11 is determined, the district court no longer has the option to
choose whether to impose sanctions. 2 '
In Thomas, the Fifth Circuit adopted the interpretation that sanctions are
mandatory under Rule 11 once a violation of the Rule is established. 2' The
court emphasized that the mandatory nature of sentence [7] was designed to
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
111. The Advisory Committee's Note states that the court "has discretion to tailor sanc-
tions to the particular facts." Id.
112. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
113. See Edward D. Cavanagh, Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 499, 500 (1986) (recognizing that sanctions
are mandatory yet judges have broad discretion both in choosing the appropriate penalty and
the appropriate target); Nelken, Sanctions, supra note 71, at 1321-22 (same); Vairo, supra note
78, at 193-94 (same).
114. For example, in Eastway I, the court specifically stated, "Rule I I is clearly phrased as
a directive. . . .At the same time, however, we note that the district courts retain broad
discretion in fashioning sanctions." Eastway 1, 762 F.2d 243, 254 n.7 (2d Cir. 1985).
115. 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988).
116. Id. at 876-78.
117. Id. at 868. The plaintiffs-employees alleged that Capital's business practices were dis-
criminatorily motivated on the basis of both race and sex. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 869.
120. Id. at 876-78
121. Id. at 876.
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maximize the deterrent effect of Rule 11 sanctions. 22 Recognizing that a
mandatory sanction could potentially chill legitimate advocacy, the Thomas
court cited to the discretionary component of the Rule as a balancing factor
from which "it can be inferred that the broad discretion given district courts
in determining sanctions was intended as a 'safety valve' to reduce the pres-
sure of mandatory sanctions." 
123
Rule 11 authorizes judges to exercise their discretion with regard to sanc-
tions in two ways: the appropriate nature of the sanction and the appropri-
ate target of the sanction. 124 In Thomas, for example, the court speculated
that an appropriate sanction can range from a verbal admonishment from
the bench to an award of attorney's fees. 12 5 In addition to the appropriate
nature of a sanction, the deterrent effect of Rule 11 is enhanced by selecting
the appropriate party to sanction. 126 In Eastway, for example, the court
concluded that Rule 11 authorizes the trial court to allocate sanctions be-
tween the attorney and his client in accordance with whomever is responsi-
ble for the frivolous filing.
1 27
Upon a comparison with original Rule 11, it is clear that the 1983 amend-
ment sought to fashion a rule which would effectively reduce abuses of the
litigation process. 12' The objective certification standard and the expanded
scope of the sanctioning provision are the two primary tools by which the
courts are empowered to pursue this ambition. 129 The judicial application of
these tools, however, has raised several concerns.
122. Id. (citing Nelken, Sanctions, supra note 71, at 1322).
123. Id. at 877.
124. See, e.g., id. at 878 (discussing the appropriate nature of sanctions); Eastway Constr.
Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 569 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (discussing the appropriate
target of sanctions), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
125. Thomas, 836 F.2d at 878. Specifically, the court speculated that an appropriate sanc-
tion "may be a warm friendly discussion on the record, a hard-nosed reprimand in open court,
compulsory legal education, [or] monetary sanctions." Id. The court continued, "[wihatever
the ultimate sanction imposed, the district court should utilize the sanction that furthers the
purposes of Rule 11." Id.
In accordance with sentence [7] of Rule 11, however, courts tend to impose a reasonable
attorney's fee most often under Rule 11. See Elizabeth C. Wiggins et al., The Federal Judicial
Center's Study of Rule 11, FJC DIRECTIONs, Nov. 1991, at 3, 18 (reporting that in the five
districts studied, monetary fees payable to the opposing party were the sanction imposed in
70% to 93% of the Rule I sanction orders); Nelken, Sanctions, supra note 71, at 1333 (noting
that attorney's fees were the sanction imposed in 96% of the Rule 11 orders issued in the first
two years after the Rule's amendment).
126. See, e.g., Eastway, 637 F. Supp. at 569.
127. Id.
128. See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 86-127 and accompanying text.
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II. RULE 11 CRITICISM
The 1983 amendment of Rule 11 has generated three categories of criti-
cism relevant to Business Guides. 130 The three relevant categories are (1) the




The central purpose of amended Rule 11 is deterrence of abusive litigation
practices in the federal courts. 134  The unpredictable application of the
Rule's language, however, undermines its deterrent effect. 135 Commentators
decried the indeterminate application of amended Rule I l's language across
both judges and circuits. 136
Courts have also recognized the detrimental effect that inconsistent appli-
cation of Rule 11 has on the deterrence of abusive conduct. For example,
the dissenting opinion in International Shipping Co. v. Hydra Offshore,
Inc. '7 challenged the majority's decision on this very ground.138 In Inter-
national Shipping, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed an order imposing Rule 11 sanctions on an attorney for seeking a
temporary restraining order in federal district court without conducting a
130. These categories of criticism are implicated by the Supreme Court's decision in Busi-
ness Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991). For a discus-
sion of the Business Guides decision in relation to the criticism of Rule 11, see infra notes 222-
37 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 134-55 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
133. See infra notes 165-77 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of the 1983
amendment to Rule 11).
135. Simply stated, "if litigants and attorneys do not have adequate notice as to what con-
stitutes a violation, the rule's deterrent value [is] undermined." Wiggins et al., supra note 125,
at 11.
136. Burbank, Transformation, supra note 78, at 1930 (indicating that there is a conflict
"on practically every important question of interpretation and policy under the Rule");
Kramer, supra note 78, at 794-802 (demonstrating statistically the inconsistency among cir-
cuits in deciding what constitutes a Rule 11 violation and how sanctions should be allocated);
Nelken, Sanctions, supra note 71, at 1329-31 (finding "little consistency among judges . . .
concerning the characteristics of an 'objectively' unacceptable pleading"); Schwarzer, Revis-
ited, supra note 79, at 1015-19 (characterizing the unpredictability under Rule 11 as "a verita-
ble Tower of Babel"); Vairo, supra note 78, at 202 (attributing Rule lI's unpredictability to the
failure of the appellate courts to provide guidance on the Rule's interpretation); Untereiner,
supra note 78, at 902 (stating that a "problem recognized by both supporters and critics has
been Rule 11's inconsistent application"). But see Wiggins et al., supra note 125, at 11-16
(reporting mixed findings regarding Rule I l's unpredictability).
137. 875 F.2d 388 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1003 (1989).
138. See id. at 395 (Pratt, J., dissenting).
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reasonable inquiry into the court's subject matter jurisdiction.139 Judge
Pratt dissented from the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions in this case on the
grounds that no Rule 11 violation was found where another attorney, in
another lawsuit, advanced the identical diversity jurisdiction argument made
by the sanctioned attorney.' 4 Judge Pratt forcefully argued that consistent
application of Rule 11 is critical to the Rule's effectiveness.
141
In Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,142 the Supreme Court acknowledged
the corrosive effect that the unpredictable application of Rule 11 has on its
deterrent capabilities. 143 Noting that "any interpretation [of Rule 11] must
give effect to the rule's central goal of deterrence,' 44 the Court then re-
solved three Rule 11 issues that had produced significant conflict at the cir-
cuit court level. 145 In Cooter & Gell, the law firm of Cooter & Gell filed, on
behalf of its client, several antitrust complaints which it later voluntarily
dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 1 46 Upon a Rule 11 motion, sanctions were imposed against the law
firm because it conducted a "grossly inadequate" prefiling inquiry into the
factual basis of its antitrust complaint.
147
The three issues presented by Cooter & Gell's appeal to the Supreme
Court had each become a source of conflict among the United States courts
of appeal. First, the Court addressed whether the law firm's voluntary dis-
missal of its antitrust complaint deprived the district court of jurisdiction to
139. Id. at 389, 393. Plaintiff's action raised a complex issue of diversity jurisdiction in-
volving foreign-incorporated, domestically-based corporations. The district court dismissed
the action upon finding that complete diversity did not exist and awarded to the defendants
$10,000 in attorney's fees. Id. at 390-91.
140. Id. at 395 (Pratt, J., dissenting). Judge Pratt noted that "identical arguments asserted
in the same district were held in one case not to violate rule 11, but to 'egregious[ly]' violate it
in the next; yet the same body of appellate and statutory law was available to both courts." Id.
(alteration in original).
141. Id. The dissent warned that "it is critical that courts articulate clear, objective stan-
dards by which attorneys can reliably measure their conduct and that we avoid the corrosive
effect of arbitrary, seemingly contradictory applications of the rule." Id.
142. 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
143. See id. at 393.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 398 (holding that a party's voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) does not
divest the court's jurisdiction to consider a Rule 11 motion); id. at 405 (holding that all aspects
of a court's Rule 11 determination should be reviewed on appeal under an abuse-of-discretion
standard); id. at 409 (holding that Rule 11 does not authorize the court to award attorney's
fees incurred on appeal).
146. Id. at 388-89.
147. Id. at 389-90. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit affirmed the sanctions and remanded to the district court to determine an appropriate
award for attorney's fees incurred by Hartmarx Corporation in defending the appeal. Id. at
390-91. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Id. at 409.
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consider a Rule 11 motion. 148 The Court held that Cooter & Gell's volun-
tary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) did not divest the district court of
jurisdiction to consider Hartmarx's Rule 11 motion. 149 Secondly, Cooter &
Gell argued that the court of appeals did not apply an appropriate standard
of review on appeal. 5 ° The Supreme Court evaluated the differing stan-
dards applied in Rule 11 proceedings15 ' as well as the standards applied in
analogous contexts before concluding that "an appellate court should apply
an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district court's
Rule 11 determination" rather than a three-tiered standard of review.' 5 2 Fi-
nally, the Court addressed whether it was error to award Hartmarx attor-
ney's fees for defending its Rule 11 sanction on appeal.'55 The Court held
that attorney's fees could only be awarded in such circumstances in which
148. Id. at 393-94. Compare Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073,
1077-79 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that the court may enforce Rule I 1 after voluntary dismissal),
cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988) and Greenberg v. Sala, 822 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1987)
(same) and Muthig v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 838 F.2d 600, 603-04 (1st Cir. 1988)
(same) with Johnson Chem. Co. v. Home Care Prods., 823 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding
that voluntary dismissal acts as a jurisdictional bar to further Rule 11 proceedings).
149. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 398.
150. Id. at 399. Compare Kale v. Combined Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 746, 756-58 (1st Cir. 1988)
(applying an across the board abuse-of-discretion standard of review) and Stevens v. Lawyers
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 789 F.2d 1056, 1060 (4th Cir. 1986) (same) and INVST Fin. Group, Inc.
v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc., 815 F.2d 391, 401-02 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 927
(1987) and O'Connell v. Champion Int'l Corp., 812 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1987) (same) and
Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1986) (same) and Thomas v. Capital Sec.
Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 871-72 (5th Cir. 1988) (same) with Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles,
780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying a three-tiered standard of review or variation
thereof) and Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1434 (7th Cir. 1987)
(same) and Eastway 1, 762 F.2d 243, 254 n.7 (2d Cir. 1985) (same).
151. Three standards of appellate review in Rule 11 cases existed prior to Cooter & Gel:
(1) a tripartite standard in which courts review disputed factual determinations under a clearly
erroneous standard, disputed legal conclusions under a de novo standard, and disputed sanc-
tion awards under an abuse of discretion standard; (2) a variation on the tripartite standard in
which courts review both disputed factual determinations and sanction awards under an abuse
of discretion standard and disputed legal conclusions under a de novo standard; (3) a uniform
abuse of discretion standard in which courts review all aspects of a Rule 11 adjudication under
a single standard. See Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 399-401; see also Louis Greco, Note, Stan-
dard ofAppellate Review ofRule 11 Decisions, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 251, 256-60 (1989) (sum-
marizing the three standards of review).
152. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405. See generally Christopher A. Considine, Note, Rule
11: Conflicting Appellate Standards of Review and a Proposed Uniform Approach, 75 CORNELL
L. REV. 727 (1991) (advocating a uniform appellate standard of review).
153. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405. Compare Muthig v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 838
F.2d 600, 607 (1st Cir. 1988) (awarding attorney's fees for an appeal under Rule 11) and Hays
v. Sony Corp., 847 F.2d 412, 419-20 (7th Cir. 1988) (same) with Basch v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 777 F.2d 165, 175 (4th Cir. 1985) (prohibiting an award of attorney's fees for an appeal
under Rule 11), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986) and Orange Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Frontline
Ventures, Ltd., 801 F.2d 1581, 1582-83 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).
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the appeal itself was frivolous because Rule 11 applies only in the district
court.'5 4 Comprehensive treatment of areas of lower court conflict similar
to the Cooter & Gell opinion represent a growing sensitivity on the part of
the courts to the unpredictability of amended Rule 1 .155
B. Satellite Litigation
As evidenced in Cooter & Gell, the unpredictable application of Rule 11
not only undermines deterrence, it also results in a judicial gridlock of con-
flicting opinions.' 5 6 It is no solution to merely endure confusion until the
Supreme Court speaks to the issue as it did in Cooter & Gell because such
discord in the lower courts spawns further litigation. "Satellite litigation" is
the ancillary hearings and discovery required in order to administer sanc-
tions under Rule 11, and it provides another source of criticism of the 1983
amendment. "
Given that the primary purpose of amended Rule 11 is "to streamline the
litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses" ' s and thereby
"to dam the flood of litigation that is threatening to inundate the courts,"1
59
a sanctioning provision that requires substantial satellite litigation would be
self-defeating." 6 Indeed, the Advisory Committee's Note recommends that
discovery and evidentiary proceedings be conducted only in extraordinary
cases to avoid satellite litigation. 6 ' Despite this admonition, however, sanc-
tion proceedings in the district courts are equally constrained by the require-
154. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 409. The costs for a frivolous appeal may be recovered
pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
155. See, e.g., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 871 (5th Cir. 1988) ("By
our opinion today, we seek to ameliorate this confusion and modify existing inequities to the
extent possible by clarifying some of the more important issues presented by the application of
Rule 11 ....").
156. See supra notes 148, 150, 153.
157. See generally Melissa L. Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Look-
ing for a Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 383, 387-89 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Nelken, Middle Ground] (questioning whether the benefits of Rule 11 are outweighed by
the burden of satellite litigation produced by the Rule); Schwarzer, A Closer Look, supra note
74, at 183 (identifying satellite litigation as a source of potential judicial reluctance to utilize
Rule 11); Schwarzer, Revisited, supra note 79, at 1017-18 (pointing out that "Rule 11 has
added substantially to the volume of motions in the district courts and appeals in the circuit
courts").
158. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
159. Robert L. Carter, The History and Purposes of Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 4, 4
(1985).
160. See supra note 79.
161. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note. "To assure that the efficiencies
achieved through more effective operation of the pleading regimen will not be offset by the cost
of satellite litigation over the imposition of sanctions, the court must to the extent possible
limit the scope of sanction proceedings to the record." Id.
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ments of due process."' Thus, courts frequently conduct extensive
evidentiary hearings in order to determine whether a Rule 11 violation has
occurred,163 as well as to assess the appropriate sanction to be imposed.'
1
C. Questionable Basis of Authority
A third category of criticism exists concerning whether the federal courts'
sanctioning authority under amended Rule 11 is beyond the scope of the
Rules Enabling Act. 1 65 Rule 11 was promulgated pursuant to the Rules
Enabling Act of 1934.166 The first sentence of 28 U.S.C. § 2072 grants the
Supreme Court the authority to implement procedural rules. 167 The second
sentence of § 2072 limits this power so that the rules prescribed by the Court
affect only procedural, and not substantive rights. 168  The Court has ad-
dressed this limitation on its rulemaking authority in several contexts. 69 In
the context of Rule 11, the Court's rulemaking power is limited by the exist-
ence of federal fee-shifting statutes. 171
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 17 1 the Supreme
Court delineated the policy that is commonly known as the "American
162. See, e.g., Sanko S.S. Co. v. Galin, 835 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1987) (providing that "the
manner in which sanctions are imposed must comport with due process requirements"); cf
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980) (stating that "[1]ike other sanctions,
attorney's fees certainly should not be assessed lightly or without fair notice and an opportu-
nity for a hearing on the record").
163. See, e.g., Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1985),
aff'd in part, vacated in part and remanded, 836 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir.), superseding 827 F.2d 450
(9th Cir. 1987), aff'd and remanded, 898 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1990).
164. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985)
(Eastway 1), on remand, 637 F. Supp. 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.)
(Eastway II), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
165. E.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997, 1008-11 (1983)
[hereinafter Burbank, Sanctions]. For an extensive study of the history and purpose of the
Rules Enabling Act, see generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982) [hereinafter Burbank, Enabling Act].
166. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
167. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1988) provides in pertinent part that "[tihe Supreme Court shall
have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure."
168. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) provides that "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right."
169. Burbank, Enabling Act, supra note 165, at 1028 n.55 (citing a number of cases, most
notably Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) and Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965)).
170. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 44-51 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (enumerating
over 100 federal fee-shifting statutes).
171. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
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Rule."' 17 2 This policy prohibits federal courts from awarding attorney's fees
in the absence of an applicable fee-shifting statute. 173 In Alyeska Pipeline,
the Court rejected a "private attorney general" exception to the American
Rule. 174 Although it declined to adopt a new exception to the American
Rule, the Supreme Court emphasized that even in the absence of fee-shifting
statutes, federal courts retain their inherent power to award attorney's fees
against a party conducting bad faith litigation. 175
The American Rule, coupled with the substantive rights limitation of the
Rules Enabling Act, form the premise of the third category of criticism. Be-
cause amended Rule 11 authorizes the award of attorney's fees in the ab-
sence of bad faith, it can be argued that the Rule modifies the substantive
rights guaranteed by federal fee-shifting statutes.1 76 Accepting this argu-
ment, the remaining basis of authority necessarily fails because the inherent
power of the federal courts is limited by the Supreme Court's decision in
Alyeska Pipeline requiring bad faith before awarding attorney's fees.
17 7
Thus, the 1983 amendment of Rule 11 flows from a questionable basis of
authority.
172. Id. at 247-64. See generally Jeffrey A. Parness, Choices About Attorney Fee-Shifting
Laws. Further Substance/Procedure Problems Under Erie and Elsewhere, 49 U. Prrr. L. REV.
393 (1988) [hereinafter Parness, Substance/Procedure] (providing a detailed analysis of the
American Rule and Alyeska Pipeline).
173. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 247, 257-60. Unlike the English system, "[iln the United
States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee
from the loser." Id. at 247.
174. Id. at 245-47. Specifically, the Court held that "the circumstances under which attor-
neys' fees are to be awarded and the range of discretion of the courts in making those awards
are matters for Congress to determine." Id. at 262; see also Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp.
v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990) (stating that "the allocation of the costs accruing from
litigation is a matter for the legislature, not the courts").
175. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 257-60. Bad-faith was one of three exceptions to the
American Rule recognized in Alyeska Pipeline. See id. at 257-59.
176. See Burbank, Sanctions, supra note 165, at 1008-11 (noting that the proposed amend-
ments to Rule 11 are inconsistent with existing, discretionary fee-shifting devices); Burbank,
Transformation, supra note 78, at 1943-49 (explaining the difficulty in unravelling sanctions
from adjudication on the merits); Cavanagh, supra note 113, at 502 (noting that fee-shifting
and Rule 11 sanctions are "inextricably intertwined"); Nelken, Middle Ground, supra note
157, at 389 (noting that Rule 11 has become a vehicle for recouping attorney's fees); see also
Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1271 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding "no clear line between attor-
neys' fees as damages and attorneys' fees as sanctions"), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987). But
see Parness, Substance/Procedure, supra note 172, at 401 (arguing the existence of a "sub-
stance/procedural dichotomy" in fee-shifting laws).
For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988) requires the court to find bad faith before awarding
attorney's fees thereunder. See, e.g., Williams v. Giant Eagle Mkts., Inc., 883 F.2d 1184, 1191
(3d Cir. 1989).
177. See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 258-59; see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447
U.S. 752, 767 (1980) (noting that a finding of bad faith must precede any sanction under the
Court's inherent powers).
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III. BUSINESS GUIDES: APPLICATION OF THE OBJECTIVE REASONABLE
INQUIRY STANDARD TO REPRESENTED PARTIES
In Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, 178 the
United States Supreme Court held that Rule 11 imposes an objective stan-
dard of reasonable inquiry on represented clients.1 79 As a result, a party
may no longer rely in good faith solely upon the advice of its attorney, but
must conduct an independent, reasonable inquiry into both the factual and
legal basis of a filing before signing it. The Business Guides decision requires
represented parties to satisfy this affirmative duty or face sanctions under the
amended Rule. This extension of Rule 11 implicates the three categories of
criticism generated by the Rule's amendment in 1983.,81
A. The Majority Opinion: Rule 11 Should Be Given Its Plain Meaning
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that Rule 11 imposes an objective reasonable
inquiry standard on represented parties who sign papers to be filed in federal
court. 18' The majority began its analysis by asserting that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure are to be given their plain meaning. 182 The Court then
determined that the objective certification standard in sentence [5] of the
Rule '1 3 clearly encompasses represented parties in addition to attorneys and
pro se parties."" In support of this conclusion, the Court embarked upon a
detailed analysis of the text of Rule 11.185
The Court contrasted the competing interpretations of sentence [5] to de-
termine which was the most natural reading of the Rule's language. 86 Busi-
ness Guides argued that the text "attorney or party" in sentence [5] of the
Rule should be read to mean "attorney or unrepresented party. '18 7 The
178. 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991).
179. Id. at 934-35.
180. See infra notes 222-37 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the Business Guides
decision in relation to the criticism of Rule 11.
181. Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 934-35. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White,
Blackmun, and Souter joined Justice O'Connor's opinion. Id. at 924.
182. See id. at 928. " 'We give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain meaning.'
... [O]ur inquiry is complete if we find the text of the Rule to be clear and unambiguous." Id.
(citation omitted).
183. "[5] The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that
the signer has read the ... paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and
belief formed after a reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and warranted by existing
law ...." FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
184. Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 928, 931.
185. See id. at 928-31.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 929-30.
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Court, however, emphasized that whereas sentences [1] and [2] of the Rule
explicitly distinguish between represented and unrepresented parties, no
such distinction is drawn in sentence [5].188 The Court asserted that "[b]y
using the more expansive term 'party,' [sentence (5)] call[s] for more expan-
sive coverage."'
189
In addition to rejecting Business Guides' argument that represented par-
ties are beyond Rule I l's certification standard, the majority was also uncon-
vinced by the company's argument that sentence [5] of the Rule nevertheless
applies a subjective standard to represented parties. 9 ' Again relying on the
plain language of Rule 11,191 the Court determined that sentence [5] draws
no distinction between attorneys and represented parties, but rather it unam-
biguously requires any signer to conduct a reasonable inquiry.192 Thus, giv-
ing Rule 11 its natural reading, the Court concluded that all signers of
papers filed in federal court are held to an objective reasonable inquiry
standard. 1
93
Lastly, the majority rejected Business Guides' argument that Rule 11, to
the extent it imposes sanctions on clients who act in good faith, violates the
Rules Enabling Act.'9 4 Business Guides contended that because it acted in
good faith, the sanctions imposed in this case constituted impermissible fee-
shifting of the type prohibited by the Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline.95
The Court identified the substantial burden facing Business Guides when
asserting a Rules Enabling Act challenge 96 and held that Rule 11 sanctions
were not fee-shifting because the "sanctions are not tied to the outcome of
litigation."' 197 Moreover, the Rule does not mandate attorney's fees as an
188. Id.
189. Id. at 930. The Court continued, "[tihe natural reading of this language is that any
party who signs a document, whether or not the party was required to do so, is subject to the
certification standard of Rule 11." Id.
190. See id. at 931-33.
191. Id. at 931.
192. Id. Sentence [5] of Rule 11 "speaks of attorneys and parties in a single breath and
applies to them a single standard." Id.
193. Id. at 933.
194. Id. at 933-34.
195. Id. at 934.
196. Id. at 933-34. The Court emphasized that Business Guides' challenge on this ground
could succeed " 'only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their
prima facie judgment that the Rule... transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor
constitutional restrictions.'" Id. at 933 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965)).
In addition, the Court reiterated that "'Rules which incidentally affect litigants' substantive
rights do not violate this provision [of the Enabling Act] if reasonably necessary to maintain
the integrity of that system of rules.' " Id. at 934 (quoting Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480
U.S. 1, 5 (1987)).
197. Id.
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appropriate sanction.198 Accordingly, the Court held that the sanctions im-
posed against Business Guides for failing to conduct an objectively reason-
able inquiry were a proper application of Rule 11.99
B. Justice Kennedy's Dissent
In the dissent, 2" Justice Kennedy rejected the majority's interpretation of
Rule 11, arguing that it exceeded the authority granted in the actual lan-
guage of the Rule.2"' Examining the complete text of Rule 11, the dissent
argued that sentence [5] of the Rule must be construed with reference to
sentences [1] and [2] as well as sentence [7].202 Justice Kennedy concluded
that Rule 11 binds only "those whose signatures are provided for in the Rule
itself."21 3 Accordingly, the certification standard of sentence [5] applies
only to the attorney representing a client and the unrepresented party ap-
pearingpro se because only their signatures are required by sentences [1] and
[2] respectively. 2°4 Moreover, sentence [7] of the Rule provides that an ap-
198. Id. Instead, the Rule mandates only that a court shall impose an appropriate sanction;
see FED. R. Civ. P. 11; see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 409 (1990)
("Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting statute .... 'A movant under Rule 11 has no entitlement to fees
or any other sanction.' ") (citation omitted). But see supra note 125 (indicating that attorney's
fees are, in practice, the predominant sanction under Rule 11).
199. Business Guides, Ill S. Ct. at 935.
200. Id. at 935- 43 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy's dissent was joined by Jus-
tices Marshall and Stevens and joined in part by Justice Scalia. Id. at 935.
201. Id. at 935-36.
202. Id. Specifically, the dissent pointed out that "[t]he majority err[ed]... in its interpre-
tation of the text which precedes and the text which follows ... sentence [5] .... And the
result is quite contrary to the Rule's history and the commentary that accompanied its adop-
tion." Id. at 935.
203. Id. at 936. Support for Justice Kennedy's conclusion is found in the reasoning of
another recent Supreme Court decision construing Rule 11. In Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel
Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 127 (1989), the Court held that Rule 11 sanctions attach
personally to the individual attorney who signs a frivolous pleading rather than to that attor-
ney's law firm. In Pavelic & LeFlore, the Court reasoned from the plain language of the Rule
that "in a paragraph beginning with a requirement of individual signature, and then proceed-
ing to discuss the import and consequences of signature, we think references to the signer in
the later portions must reasonably be thought to connote the individual signer mentioned at
the outset." Id. at 124.
The majority distinguished Pavelic & LeFlore by arguing that in that case, the Court relied
on "Rule I l's unambiguous statement that papers must be signed by an attorney 'in the attor-
ney's individual name.' " Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 931. After pointing out that a corpo-
rate entity can only act through its agents, Justice O'Connor indicated that coverage of
Business Guides is necessary to avoid the anomaly of Rule 11 applying to a represented indi-
vidual but not a corporate client because it cannot itself sign a filing. Apparently recognizing
that this argument begs the question, the majority concluded that "[i]n any event, the question
need not be resolved definitely here; Business Guides concedes that it did not raise this argu-
ment in the courts below." Id.
204. Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 935 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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propriate sanction shall be imposed "upon the person who signed [the frivo-
lous paper], a represented party, or both."2 5 Under the dissent's analysis of
Rule 11, therefore, an attorney must violate the Rule before a represented
party can be sanctioned and even then, such a sanction would be an abuse of
discretion if the represented party acted in good faith.216
Justice Kennedy also argued that the majority's application of Rule lI's
reasonable inquiry standard to represented parties reaches well beyond the
judiciary's traditional power to regulate practice and procedure.20 7 Justice
Kennedy emphasized that whereas the courts have traditionally regulated
the standards appropriate for the bar, the federal judiciary has no similar
expertise with regard to the "workings of private enterprise. "208 The dissent
contended that such an application of Rule 11 exceeds the Court's rulemak-
ing authority because it redistributes litigation costs in a manner similar to
the fee-shifting theory rejected in Alyeska Pipeline.2°9 The dissent asserted
that when used as a fee-shifting mechanism, Rule 11 threatens to chill the
filing of meritorious lawsuits. 2 0 Accordingly, the dissent concluded that by
imposing an objective standard of reasonable inquiry on a represented party,
the majority's interpretation of Rule 11 is a breach of the substantive rights
limitation of the Rules Enabling Act.2 1
IV. THE CASE FOR RULE 11 REFORM
Although the Business Guides case illustrates precisely the egregious con-
duct that Rule 11 is intended to discourage, the Supreme Court's decision is
205. FED. R. Civ. P. 1!. Justice Kennedy asserted that "[iln my view, this sentence con-
templates that the represented party and the person who signs will be different persons." Busi-
ness Guides, Il1 S. Ct. at 936 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 942.
207. Id. at 940-42.
208. Id. The dissent continued:
though the majority would seem to suggest it, I should not have thought that before a
person or entity seeks the aid of the federal courts, it ought to know the contents of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rules that, at least until now, were the domain
of lawyers and not the community as a whole.
Id. at 942.
209. Id. at 940-41. Justice Kennedy pointed out that the majority's attempt to distinguish
"the fee-shifting at issue in Alyeska Pipeline breaks down in a case like this one where the
'discrete event' was the filing of the lawsuit and the 'appropriate sanction' was the payment of
[Chromatic's] attorney's fees." Id. at 941 (referring to Justice O'Connor's argument at page
934 of the opinion).
210. Id. Therefore, the dissent resolved that "[w]hether or not Rule 11 as construed by the
majority exceeds our rule-making authority, these concerns weigh in favor of a reasonable,
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not faithful to the plain language of the Rule and exhibits several of the
problems revealed by the judicial and scholarly criticism surrounding
amended Rule 11.212 In an attempt to advance the underlying purpose of the
Rule, the Court incorrectly extended Rule 11 beyond its plain meaning when
it failed to confront several portions of the Advisory Committee's Note that
contradicted its interpretation of the Rule's language.
A. Rule l's Technical Flaw
The Business Guides majority failed to address the Advisory Committee's
focus on the attorney's conduct in amending Rule 11. 2 13 In discussing the
amended certification standard, the Advisory Committee's Note indicates
that the affirmative duty relates to attorneys.214 Although it provides that
sanctions may be imposed upon a represented party as well as the attorney
for a violation of Rule 11, the Committee's Note nevertheless contemplates
that the signer subject to the objective reasonable inquiry requirement will be
the attorney and not the client.215 As guidance on this issue, the Advisory
Committee's Note relies on Browning Debenture Holders' Committee v.
DASA Corp.
2 16
In Browning, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that attorney's fees should not be imposed upon a represented party
unless the party was personally "aware of or otherwise responsible for the
procedural action instituted in bad faith. ' 217 The reference to Browning in
the Advisory Committee's Note arguably indicates that sanctions imposed
against represented parties under Rule 11 should be limited to bad faith con-
212. See supra text accompanying notes 130-77.
213. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
214. The Advisory Committee's Note refers to "[t]he expanded nature of the lawyer's certi-
fication in the fifth sentence of amended Rule I L." Id. (emphasis added). See Business Guides,
Il1 S. Ct. at 937 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
215. The Advisory Committee's Note states that "[i]f the duty imposed by the rule is vio-
lated, the court should have the discretion to impose sanctions on either the attorney, the party
the signing attorney represents, or both, or on an unrepresented party who signed the pleading,
and the new rule so provides." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (emphasis
added).
The failure of the Advisory Committee's Note to mention the signature of a represented
party in this sentence assumes that "the duty imposed by the rule" is only violated by the
attorney's signature. See Business Guides, I I S. Ct. at 937. Support for this interpretation is
found in the very next paragraph of the Advisory Committee's Note which continues, "[elven
though it is the attorney whose signature violates the rule, it may be appropriate under the
circumstances of the case to impose a sanction on the client." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory
committee's note (citing Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078
(2d Cir. 1977)) (emphasis added); see Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 937.
216. 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977).
217. Id. at 1089.
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duct which would also justify an award of attorney's fees under the court's
inherent powers.21 8
These references to the Advisory Committee's Note, coupled with the dis-
sent's reasonable analysis of Rule I l's plain language,21 9 support the conclu-
sion that Rule 11 technically does not reach the egregious conduct found in
Business Guides.22° Although imposing sanctions despite the technical flaw
in Rule I l's language serves the underlying purpose of the Rule, such a deci-
sion raises serious collateral difficulties. 221
B. Collateral Problems of Rule 11
The Business Guides decision manifests the problems that mark the unpre-
dictable application of Rule 11.222 This novel interpretation of Rule 11 in
the lower courts of the Ninth Circuit produced extensive satellite litigation,
including three separate evidentiary hearings by a magistrate to determine
the appropriate sanction,22 3 as well as appeals to both the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals 224 and the Supreme Court.225 Moreover, the Supreme
Court affirmed a court of appeals decision which vacated the district court
218. See Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1474 (2d Cir. 1988),
rev'd in part sub nom., Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989)
(reasoning likewise). But see Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters.,
892 F.2d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991) (distinguishing Browning).
219. See supra notes 200-211 and accompanying text.
220. Judge Weinstein anticipated this technical flaw in the language of Rule 11 in Eastway:
In the case in which it was suggested that fees be assessed against the client alone,
Rule 11 does not-technically speaking--even apply. Rule 11 does not, by its terms,
provide for sanctions against the filing of frivolous papers. Rather, it provides for
sanctions against an attorney's filing papers without making an adequate inquiry. In
a case in which an attorney makes a reasonable inquiry into the facts but still ends up
filing a frivolous pleading because his client deceived him, there has technically not
been any violation of Rule 11. Consequently, there is technically no basis for the
imposition of sanctions, even against the client who in bad faith induced the filing
[of] a frivolous suit. This conclusion, however, is completely at odds with the spirit
of the Rule. It would also lead to bizarre consequences, because it would mean that
clients could be sanctioned in cases where they were partially responsible for filing
frivolous papers, but not in cases where their responsibility was total. The better
conclusion is that sanctions may be imposed against the client under the circum-
stances described above despite the flaw in the Rule's language.
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 569-70 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), modi-
fied, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
221. See infra text accompanying notes 222-37.
222. See supra notes 134-55 and accompanying text.
223. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 892 F.2d 802, 806
(9th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991).
224. Id. at 803.
225. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922, 927
(1991).
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order and remanded the case for reconsideration of the sanction imposed.2 26
Business Guides, therefore, illustrates the inordinate amount of satellite liti-
gation spawned by the indeterminant application of the Rule's language.
22 7
In addition, unpredictability undermines Rule lI's effectiveness as a deter-
rent and chills legitimate advocacy in the long-term.22 Business Guides is
again instructive; for although the majority opinion settles an issue of con-
flict concerning the interpretation of Rule 11,229 the decision in fact opens
the door to another area of Rule 11 discord.230 Justice Kennedy recognized
this problem as the corollary to extending the Rule's text beyond its logical
reach when he noted that the majority expressly preserved the issue of what
standard would apply in deciding whether to impose Rule 11 sanctions
against a represented party who has not signed a frivolous filing.23 '
Finally, as the courts stray further and further from the plain language of
Rule 11, their sanctioning authority becomes ever more murky.2 32 The
Rules Enabling Act represents Congress' intent that the courts regulate
practice and procedure but leave the definition of substantive rights to fed-
eral law.2 3 3 The majority's interpretation of Rule 11 in Business Guides runs
afoul, or at least walks the edge, of this limitation. 234 Despite an express
finding of good faith, 235 Business Guides was sanctioned in an amount equal
to Chromatic's attorney's fees for its failure to conduct a reasonable inquiry
before filing affidavits in support of a TRO.236 Arguably, therefore, the
Supreme Court redistributed litigation costs in the absence of bad faith-a
remedy that is not authorized by federal law or the Court's inherent
powers.237
226. Id.
227. See supra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 134-55 and accompanying text.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 14-22.
230. See Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 935 (preserving the issue of "whether or under what
circumstances a non-signing party may be sanctioned" under Rule 11); see also id. at 941
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (underscoring the open issue).
231. Id. at 941. "The chilling impact of the majority's negligence standard will be much
greater if the majority applies it in that circumstance as well." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
232. See id. at 943; see also supra text accompanying notes 165-77 (framing the argument
that amended Rule 11 violates the substantive rights limitation of the Rules Enabling Act).
233. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988); Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 940 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
234. See Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 942.
235. See id. at 926.
236. Id. at 927.
237. See supra notes 165-77 and accompanying text.
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C. The Necessary Reform
The Business Guides decision reveals the inadequacies in the text of Rule
11. Specifically, an examination of the majority and dissenting opinions
demonstrates that the plain text of the Rule technically does not reach the
very conduct at issue in that case. 238 The Court nevertheless sanctioned the
company since deterrence of this type of egregious conduct was clearly
within the spirit of Rule 11.211 Under such circumstances, where the central
purpose underlying the Rule is not adequately advanced by the plain mean-
ing of its text, Rule 11 should be revised so as to better deter abuses of the
judicial process.
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules published a call for written com-
ments on Rule 11 on January 24, 1990.2" o After reviewing the empirical
research and public commentary that it received, the Advisory Committee
completed a preliminary draft of its proposed amendment to Rule 1 1.241
Included in the preliminary draft is an amendment that would reverse the
Supreme Court's decision in Business Guides.242 This amendment to Rule
11 would permit monetary sanctions to be imposed against a represented
party only where the party has filed a paper for an "improper purpose, such
238. Compare supra text accompanying notes 181-99 with text accompanying notes 200-11.
239. See Business Guides, I ll S. Ct. at 930.
240. The call for written comments on Rule 11 was published at 59 U.S.L.W. 2117 (1990)
and 131 F.R.D. 344 (1990).
241. See Wiggins et al., supra note 125, at 35-40 (publishing the full text of the proposed
amended Rule as well as describing the proposed changes).
242. The preliminary draft provides, in relevant part, that Rule 11 sanctions may be im-
posed against a represented party only for a violation of section (b)(1) as follows:
(b) REPRESENTATIONS TO COURT. By presenting or maintaining a claim, defense,
request, demand, objection, contention, or argument in a pleading, written motion,
or other paper filed with or submitted to the court, an attorney or unrepresented
party is certifying, until it is withdrawn, that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances-
(1) it is not being presented or maintained for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation ....
(c) SANCTIONS. Subject to the conditions stated below, the court shall impose an
appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties determined, after no-
tice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, to be responsible for a violation of
subdivision (b).
(2) NATURE OF SANCTION; LIMITATIONS.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded either on motion or on the court's
initiative, against a represented party unless it is determined to be responsible for a
violation of subdivision (b)(1).
See id. at 40.
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as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. '2 43 By limiting monetary sanctions against a represented party to
situations involving bad faith, the proposed amendment would avoid any
conflict with the Rules Enabling Act by bringing Rule 11 into line with fed-
eral fee-shifting statutes, 2 " the federal judiciary's inherent sanctioning
power,245 and Rule 56(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.246 Adop-
tion of this portion of the Advisory Committee's proposed amendment to
Rule 11, moreover, would benefit both litigants and the courts by clarifying
the circumstances under which clients should be sanctioned which in turn
should enhance deterrence.247
V. CONCLUSION
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposes an affirmative
duty upon attorneys and unrepresented parties to certify that prior to filing
any paper with the court, they have conducted a reasonable inquiry into the
factual and legal basis of the paper. This certification is evaluated by an
objective standard of reasonableness under the circumstances. When a pa-
per is signed in violation of this standard, Rule 11 mandates the imposition
of sanctions against the signer. The United States Supreme Court held in
Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises that a repre-
sented party who signs a paper without first conducting an objective reason-
able inquiry shall be sanctioned under Rule 11.
The Court grappled with the anomalous possibility that Rule 1 's plain
language did not technically encompass conduct that so egregiously violated
the spirit of the Rule. Adhering to the central purpose underlying Rule 11,
the Rule was interpreted so as to reach the conduct at issue. The Court's
tenuous interpretation of the plain language of the Rule confirmed much of
the critical literature surrounding Rule 11 generally. Business Guides, in this
sense, fortifies the case for Rule 11 reform.
Scott B. Gilly
243. See id.
244. See supra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
245. See id.
246. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(g) permits the court to award attorney's fees against a party who
submits an affidavit, supporting or opposing summary judgment, in bad faith or for purposes of
delay.
247. See supra notes 134-55.
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